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The Future of Law and Mobility  
Daniel A. Crane† 
 
Introduction 
 
With the launch of the new Journal of Law and Mobility, 
the University of Michigan is recognizing the transformative 
impact of new transportation and mobility technologies, from 
cars, to trucks, to pedestrians, to drones.  The coming 
transition towards intelligent, automated, and connected 
mobility systems will transform not only the way people and 
goods move about, but also the way human safety, privacy, 
and security are protected, cities are organized, machines 
and people are connected, and the public and private spheres 
are defined. 
Law will be at the center of these transformations, as it 
always is.  There has already been a good deal of thinking  
about the ways that law must adapt to make connected and 
automated mobility feasible in areas like tort liability, 
insurance, federal preemption, and data privacy.1  But it is 
also not too early to begin pondering the many implications 
for law and regulation arising from the technology’s spillover 
effects as it begins to permeate society.  For better or worse, 
connected and automated mobility will disrupt legal practices 
and concepts in a variety of ways additional to the obvious 
“regulation of the car.” Policing practices and Fourth 
Amendment law, now so heavily centered on routine 
automobile stops, will of necessity require reconsideration. 
Notions of ownership of physical property (i.e., an automobile) 
 
 † Frederick Paul Furth, Sr. Professor of Law, University of 
Michigan.  I am grateful for helpful comments from Ellen Partridge 
and Bryant Walker Smith.  All errors are my own. 
1 See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, Kyle D. Logue & Bryce Pilz, A 
Survey of Legal Issues Arising from the Deployment of Autonomous 
and Connected Vehicles, 23 Mich. Tel. & Tech. L. Rev. 191 (2017). 
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and data (i.e., accident records) will be challenged by the 
automated sharing economy.  And the economic and 
regulatory structure of the transportation network will have 
to be reconsidered as mobility transitions from a largely 
individualistic model of drivers in their own cars pursuing 
their own ends within the confines of general rules of the 
road to a model in which shared and interconnected vehicles 
make collective decisions to optimize the system’s 
performance.  In these and many other ways, the coming 
mobility revolution will challenge existing legal concepts and 
practices with implications far beyond the “cool new gadget of 
driverless cars.”  
Despite the great importance of the coming mobility 
revolution, the case for a field of study in “law and mobility” 
is not obvious. In this inaugural essay for the Journal of Law 
and Mobility, I shall endeavor briefly to make that case.  
I. DRIVERLESS CARS AND THE LAW OF THE HORSE 
 
A technological phenomenon can be tremendously 
important to society without necessarily meriting its own field 
of legal study because of what Judge Frank Easterbrook has 
described as “the law of the horse” problem.2  Writing against 
the burgeoning field of “Internet law” in the early 1990s, 
Easterbrook argued against organizing legal analysis around 
particular technologies: 
 
[T]he best way to learn the law applicable to 
specialized endeavors is to study general rules. Lots 
of cases deal with sales of horses; others deal with 
people kicked by horses; still more deal with the 
licensing and racing of horses, or with the care 
veterinarians give to horses, or with prizes at horse 
shows. Any effort to collect these strands into a 
course on “The Law of the Horse” is doomed to be 
shallow and to miss unifying principles.3 
 
Prominent advocates of “Internet law” as a field rebutted 
Easterbrook’s concern, arguing that focusing on cyberlaw as 
a field could be productive to understanding aspects of this 
 
2 Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 
1996 U. Chi. Legal F. 207, 207-16. 
3 Id. 
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important human endeavor in ways that merely studying 
general principles might miss.4  Despite Easterbrook’s 
protestation, a distinct field of cyberlaw has grown up in 
recent decades. 
“The law of the horse” debate seems particularly apt to 
the question of law and mobility since the automobile is the 
lineal successor of the horse as society’s key transportation 
technology.  Without attempting to offer a general solution to 
the “law of the horse” question, it is worth drawing a 
distinction between two different kinds of disruptive 
technologies—those in which the technological change 
produces social changes indirectly and without significant 
possibilities for legal intervention, and those in which law is 
central to the formation of the technology itself.   
An example of the first species of technological change is 
air conditioning. The rise of air conditioning in the mid-
twentieth century had tremendous effects on society, 
including dramatic increases in business productivity, 
changes in living patterns as people shifted indoors, and the 
extension of retail store hours and hence the growing 
commercialization of American culture.5 The South’s share of 
U.S. population was in steady decline until the 1960s when, 
in lockstep with the growth of air conditioning and people’s 
willingness to settle in hot places, the trend abruptly reversed 
and the South’s share grew dramatically.6  The political 
consequences were enormous—from Richard Nixon through 
George W. Bush, every elected President hailed from warm 
climates.   
One could say, without exaggeration, that the Willis 
Carrier’s frigid contraption exerted a greater effect on 
American business, culture, and politics than almost any 
other invention in the twentieth century.  And, yet, it would 
seem silly to launch a field of study in “law and air 
conditioning.” Air conditioning’s social, economic, and 
political effects were largely indirect—the result of human 
 
4 Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might 
Teach, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 501 (1999). 
5 Stan Cox, Losing Our Cool: Uncomfortable Truths About Our 
Air-Conditioned World (and Finding New Ways to Get Through the 
Summer) (2012). 
6 Paul Krugman, Air Conditioning and the Rise of the South, 
New York Times March 28, 2015, 
https://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/03/28/air-
conditioning-and-the-rise-of-the-south/. 
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decisions in response to the new circumstances created by 
the new technology rather than an immediate consequence of 
the technology itself. Even if regulators had foreseen the 
dramatic demographic effects of air conditioning’s spread, 
there is little they could have done (short of killing or limiting 
the technology) to mediate the process of change by 
regulating the technology. 
Contrast the Internet.  Like air conditioning, the Internet 
has had tremendous implications for culture, business, and 
politics, but unlike air conditioning, many of these effects 
were artifacts of design decisions regarding the legal 
architecture of cyberspace. From questions of taxation of 
online commercial transactions,7 to circumvention of digital 
rights management technologies,8 to personal jurisdiction 
over geographically remote online interlocutors,9 and in 
countless other ways, a complex of legal and regulatory 
decisions created the modern Internet.  From the beginning, 
law was hovering over the face of cyberspace.  Al Gore may 
not have created the Internet, but lawyers had as much to do 
with it as did engineers. 
The Internet’s legal architecture was not established at a 
single point in time, by a single set of actors, or with a single 
set of ideological commitments or policy considerations.  
Copyright structures were born of the contestation among 
one set of stakeholders, which was distinct from the sets of 
stakeholders contesting over tax policy, net neutrality, or 
revenge porn.  And yet, the decisions made in separate 
regulatory spheres often interact in underappreciated ways to 
lend the Internet its social and economic character.  Tax 
policy made Amazon dominant in retail, copyright policy 
made Google dominant in search, and data protection law (or 
its absence) made Facebook dominant in social media—with 
the result that all three have become antitrust problems. 
Whether or not law students should be encouraged to 
study “Internet law” in a discrete course, it seems evident 
with the benefit of thirty years of hindsight that the role of 
 
7 See, e.g., John E. Sununu, The Taxation of Internet 
Commerce, 39 Harv. J. Leg. 325 (2002). 
8 See, e.g., David Nimmer, A Rif on Fair Use in the Digital 
Millenium Copyright Act, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 673 (2000). 
9 Note, No Bad Puns: A Different Approach to the Problem  of 
Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1821 
(2003). 
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law in mediating cyberspace cannot be adequately 
comprehended without a systemic inquiry.  Mobility, I would 
argue, will be much the same.  While the individual 
components of the coming shift toward connectivity and 
automation—i.e., insurance, tort liability, indemnification, 
intellectual property, federal preemption, municipal traffic 
law, etc.—will have analogues in known circumstances and 
hence will benefit from consideration as general questions of 
insurance, torts, and so forth, the interaction of the many 
moving parts will produce a novel, complex ecosystem.  Given 
the potential of that ecosystem to transform human life in 
many significant ways, it is well worth investing some effort 
in studying “law and mobility” as a comprehensive field. 
II. An Illustration from Three Connected Topics 
It would be foolish to attempt a description of mobility’s 
future legal architecture at this early stage in the mobility 
revolution.  However, in an effort to provide some further 
motivation for the field of “law and mobility,” let me offer an 
illustration from three areas in which legal practices and 
doctrines may be affected in complex ways by the shift toward 
connected and automated vehicles.  Although these three 
topics entail consideration of separate fields of law, the 
technological and legal decisions made with respect to them 
could well have system-wide implications, which shows the 
value of keeping the entire system in perspective as discrete 
problems are addressed. 
A. Policing and Public Security 
 
For better or for worse, the advent of automated vehicles 
will redefine the way that policing and law enforcement are 
conducted. Routine traffic stops are fraught, but potentially 
strategically significant, moments for police-citizen 
interactions.  Half of all citizen-police interactions,10 more 
 
10 Samuel Walker, Science and Politics in Police Research: 
Reflections on their Tangled Relationship, 593 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. 
& Soc. Sci. 137, 142 (2004); ATTHEW R. DUROSE ET. AL., U.S. 
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU 
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE 
PUBLIC, 2005, 1 (2007), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/. 
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than forty percent of all drug arrests,11 and over 30% of police 
shootings12 occur in the context of traffic stops. Much of the 
social tension over racial profiling and enforcement inequality 
has arisen in the context of police practices with respect to 
minority motorists.13 The traffic stop is central to modern 
policing, including both its successes and pathologies. 
Will there continue to be routine police stops in a world of 
automated vehicles?  Surely traffic stops will not disappear 
altogether, since driverless cars may still have broken 
taillights or lapsed registrations.14  But with the advent of 
cars programmed to follow the rules of the road, the number 
of occasions for the police to stop cars will decline 
significantly.  As a general matter, the police need probable 
cause to stop a vehicle on a roadway.15 A world of 
predominantly automated vehicles will mean many fewer 
traffic violations and hence many fewer police stops and 
many fewer police-citizen interactions and arrests for 
evidence of crime discovered during those stops.   
On the positive side, that could mean a significant 
reduction in some of the abuses and racial tensions around 
policing.  But it could also deprive the police of a crime 
detection dragnet, with the consequence either that the crime 
rate will increase due to the lower detection rate or that the 
police will deploy new crime detection strategies that could 
create new problems of their own. 
Addressing these potentially sweeping changes to the 
practices of policing brought about by automated vehicle 
technologies requires considering both the structure of the 
relevant technology and the law itself.  On the technological 
side, connected and automated vehicles could be designed for 
easy monitoring and controlling by the police.  That could 
entail a decline in privacy for vehicle occupants, but also 
potentially reduce the need for physical stops by the police 
 
11 David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the 
Future of the Fourth Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 271, 299. 
12 Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148 n.3 (1972). 
13 Ronnie A. Dunn, Racial Profiling: A Persistent Civil Rights 
Challenge Even in the Twenty-First Century, 66 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 
957, 979 (2016) (reporting statistics on disproportionate effects on 
racial minorities of routine traffic stops). 
14 See John Frank Weaver, Robot, Do You Know Why I Stopped 
You?, http://www.slate.com/technology/2018/05/judge-naomi-
reice-buchwald-rules-trump-cant-block-twitter-users.html. 
15 Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
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(cars that can be remotely monitored can be remotely 
ticketed) and hence some of the police-citizen roadside 
friction that has dominated recent troubles.   
On the legal side, the advent of connected and automated 
vehicles will require rethinking the structure of Fourth 
Amendment law as required to automobiles.  At present, 
individual rights as against searches and seizures often rely 
on distinctions between drivers and passengers, or owners 
and occupants. For example, a passenger in a car may 
challenge the legality of the police stop of a car,16 but have 
diminished expectations of privacy in the search of the 
vehicle’s interior if they are not the vehicle’s owners or 
bailees.17 In a mobility fleet without drivers and (as discussed 
momentarily) perhaps without many individual owners, these 
conceptions of the relationship of people to cars will require 
reconsideration.  
 
B. Ownership, Sharing, and the Public/Private Divide 
In American culture, the individually owned automobile 
has historically been far more than a transportation device—
it has been an icon of freedom, mobility, and personal 
identity.  As Ted McAllister has written concerning the growth 
of automobile culture in the early twentieth century: 
 
The automobile squared perfectly with a 
distinctive American ideal of freedom—freedom 
of mobility.  Always a restless nation, with 
complex migratory patterns throughout the 17th, 
18th, and 19th centuries, the car came just as a 
certain kind of mobility had reached an end 
with the closing of the frontier. But the 
restlessness had not ended, and the car allowed 
control of space like no other form of 
transportation.18 
 
 
16 Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249 (2007). 
17 U.S. v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
18 Ted v. McAllister, Cars, Individualism, and the Paradox of 
Freedom in a Mass Society, 
https://www.frontporchrepublic.com/2011/10/cars-individualism-
and-the-paradox-of-freedom-in-a-mass-society/. 
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Individual car ownership has long been central to 
conceptions of property and economic status. The average 
American adult currently spends about ten percent of his or 
her income on an automobile,19 making it by far his or her 
most expensive item of personal property.  The social costs of 
individual automobile ownership are far higher.20 
The automobile’s run as an icon of social status through 
ownership may be ending.  Futurists expect that the 
availability of on-demand automated vehicle service will 
complete the transition from mobility as personal property to 
mobility as a service, as more and more households stop 
buying cars and rely instead on ride sharing services.21  Ride 
sharing companies like Uber and Lyft have long been on this 
case, and now automobile manufacturers are scrambling to 
market their vehicles as shared services.22  With the decline 
of individual ownership, what will happen to conceptions of 
property in the physical space of the automobile, in the 
contractual right to use a particular car or fleet of 
automobiles, and in the data generated about occupants and 
vehicles? 
The coming transition from individual ownership to 
shared service will also raise important questions about the 
line between the public and private domains.  At present, the 
“public sphere” is defined by mass transit whereas the 
individually owned automobile constitutes the “private 
sphere.”  The public sphere operates according to ancient 
 
19 Máté Petrány, This Is How Much Americans Spend on their 
Cars, https://jalopnik.com/this-is-how-much-americans-spend-on-
their-cars-1596515156. 
20 Edward Humes, The Absurd Primacy of the Automobile in 
American Life, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/04/absurd-
primacy-of-the-car-in-american-life/476346/; Robert Moor, What 
Happens to the American Myth When You Take the Driver Out of It?, 
http://nymag.com/selectall/2016/10/is-the-self-driving-car-un-
american.html. 
21 Smart Cities and the Vehicle Ownership Shift, 
https://www.automotiveworld.com/analysis/smart-cities-vehicle-
ownership-shift/. 
22 Ryan Felton, GM Aims to Get Ahead of Everyone with 
Autonomous Ride-Sharing Service in Multiple Cities by 2019, 
https://jalopnik.com/gm-aims-to-get-ahead-of-everyone-with-
autonomous-ride-s-1820886131. 
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common carrier rules of universal access and non-
discrimination, whereas a car is not quite “a man’s castle on 
wheels” for constitutional purposes,23 but still a non-public 
space dominated by individual rights as against the state 
rather than public obligations.24  As more and more vehicles 
are held and used in shared fleets rather than individual 
hands, the traditional line between publicly minded “mass 
transit” and individually minded vehicle ownership will come 
under pressure, with significant consequences for both 
efficiency and equality. 
 
C. Platform Mobility, Competition, and Regulation 
 
The coming transition toward ride sharing fleets rather 
than individual vehicle ownership described in the previous 
section will have additional important implications for the 
economic structure of mobility—which of course will raise 
important regulatory questions as well.  At present, the 
private transportation system is highly atomistic.  In the 
United States alone, there are 264 million individually owned 
motor vehicles in operation.25  For the reasons previously 
identified, expect many of these vehicles to shift toward 
corporate-owned fleets in coming years.  The question then 
will be how many such fleets will operate—whether we will 
see robust fleet-to-fleet competition or instead the 
convergence toward a few dominant providers as we are 
seeing in other important areas of the “platform economy.” 
There is every reason to believe that, before too long, 
mobility will tend in the direction of other monopoly or 
oligopoly platforms because it will share their economic 
structure.  The key economic facts behind the rise of 
dominant platforms like Amazon, Twitter, Google, Facebook, 
 
23 See Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 424 (2004) (“The Fourth 
Amendment does not treat a motorist's car as his castle.”). 
24 E.g., Byrne v. Rutledge, 623 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding 
the motor vehicle license plates were nonpublic fora and that state’s 
ban on vanity plates referencing religious topic violated First 
Amendment). 
25 U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Transportation Energy Data Book, 
Chapter 8, Household Vehicles and Characteristics, Table 8.1, 
Population and Vehicle Profile, 
https://cta.ornl.gov/data/chapter8.shtml (last visited May 29, 
2018). 
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Microsoft, and Apple are the presence of scale economies and 
network effects—system attributes that make the system 
more desirable for others users as new users join.26  In the 
case of the mobility revolution, a number of features are 
suggestive of future scale economies and network effects.  
The more cars in a fleet, the more likely it is that one will be 
available when summoned by a user.27  The more cars 
connected to other cars in a fleet, the higher the quality of the 
information (on such topics as road and weather conditions 
and vehicle performance) available within the fleet and the 
steeper the machine learning curve. 
As is true with other platforms, the mere presence of 
scale economic and network effects does not have to lead 
inexorably to market concentration or monopoly.  Law and 
regulation may intervene to mitigate these effects, for example 
by requiring information sharing or interconnection among 
rival platforms.  But such mandatory information sharing or 
interconnection obligations are not always advisable, as they 
can diminish a platform’s incentives to invest in its own 
infrastructure or otherwise impair incentives to compete. 
Circling back to the “law of the horse” point raised at 
the outset, these issues are not, of course, unique to law and 
mobility.  But this brief examination of these three topics—
policing, ownership, and competition—shows the value of 
considering law and mobility as a distinct topic.  
Technological, legal, and regulatory decisions we make with 
respect to one particular set of problems will have 
implications for distinct problems perhaps not under 
consideration at that moment.  For example, law and 
technology will operate conjunctively to define the bounds of 
privacy expectations in connected and automated vehicles, 
with implications for search and seizure law, property and 
data privacy norms, and sharing obligations to promote 
competition.  Pulling a “privacy lever” in one context—say to 
safeguard against excessive police searches—could have 
 
26 See generally David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, A 
Guide to the Antitrust Economics of Networks, Antitrust, Spring 
1996, at 36; Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition 
and Network Effects, 8 J. Econ. Persp. 93 (1994). 
 
27 This should hold even though a larger fleet would also mean 
more subscribers, since the average distance between a user and an 
available vehicle should decline with an increase in the fleet’s 
market penetration. 
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spillover effects in another context, for example by bolstering 
a dominant mobility platform’s arguments against mandatory 
data sharing.  Although the interactions between the different 
technological decisions and related legal norms are surely 
impossible to predict or manage with exactitude, 
consideration of law and mobility as a system will permit a 
holistic view of this complex, evolving ecosystem. 
Conclusion 
Law and regulation will be at the center of the coming 
mobility revolution. Many of the patterns we will observe at 
the intersection of law and the new technologies will be 
familiar—at least if we spend the time to study past 
technological revolutions—and general principles will be 
sufficient to answer many of the rising questions.  At the 
same time, there is a benefit to considering the field of law 
and mobility comprehensively with an eye to understanding 
the often subtle interactions between discrete technological 
and legal decisions.  The Journal of Law and Mobility aims to 
play an important role in this fast-moving space. 
